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ABSTRACT 
In 4 studies, the authors demonstrated that when errors associated with action were 
inconsistent with decision makers' orientation, they were undesirable and produced more regret 
than did errors associated with inaction. Conversely, when errors associated with action were 
consistent with decision makers' orientation, they were desirable and produced less regret than 
did errors associated with inaction. Desirability and consistency mediated this relationship, 
independent of mutability. These results were obtained when judgments and decisions to act or 
not act were made in close temporal proximity to one another as well as when participants 
reflected on their past decisions. The authors provide an analysis of when counterfactuals would 
and would not be expected to mediate judgments of normality and regret. 
  
Norm theory (e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 1986) contributed to the understanding of the judgment 
process and altered the conceptualization of how judgments of normality are construed. In norm 
theory (e.g., Kahneman, 1995; Kahneman & Miller, 1986), a norm is conceptualized as a set of 
recruited representations. These representations can be fragmented, and they can be 
constructed ad hoc. Therefore, each event can have its own associated set of constructed 
counterfactual alternatives. These counterfactuals, or possible worlds, in turn influence the 
normality of an event. Because an event or another evoking stimulus may be compared with its 
counterfactual alternatives, the normality of the event can depend on the availability of 
counterfactual alternatives—the event's mutability. 
According to norm theory, mutability not only influences judgments of normality, it also 
influences a perceiver's affective response (e.g., Baron & Ritov, 1994; Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; 
Gilovich, Medvec, & Chen, 1995; Gleicher et al., 1990; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Landman, 
1987, 1994). For example, if an accident involves abnormal or exceptional circumstances, a 
perceiver can easily construe alternatives for the accident (e.g., undoing it); if the accident 
involves very normal circumstances, few alternatives can be constructed. Because of this 
difference in mutability, the abnormal action is associated with especially high levels of regret. 
In a similar vein, it is assumed that it is especially easy to imagine not performing an action. 
Therefore, acts of commission (errors associated with decisions to act) are expected to be 
associated with higher levels of regret than are acts of omission (errors associated with 
decisions not to act). Research supports this prediction. When an action and an inaction 
producing identical losses were compared, it was the action (the act of commission) that was 
associated with the highest level of regret (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Subsequent 
studies using both positive and negative outcomes and various decision contexts have 
replicated this finding (e.g., Baron & Ritov, 1994; Gilovich et al., 1995; Gleicher et al., 1990; 
Landman, 1987, 1994). 
However, researchers investigating regret judgments following actions versus inactions have 
typically not measured the mutability of the action versus the inaction (see N'gbala & 
Branscombe, 1997). Therefore, it is possible that differences in regret levels following errors in 
actions or inactions are not always the result of differences in mutability. Rather, because 
judgments of regret involve affect, the desirability of the decision itself may mediate the 
relationship between the decision (e.g., those involving action or inaction) and judgments of 
regret. Consequently, decisions to act or not act that are especially desirable may produce 
especially low levels of regret, independent of perceivers' ability to engage in counterfactual 
thinking. Feelings of desirability, then, may mediate the relationship between action or inaction 
and judgments of regret. 
In many decision-making situations, a critical dimension of a decision's desirability is whether it 
is consistent with the decision maker's orientation (i.e., the individual's personality, knowledge 
structure, mood, or goals). This is the case because of individuals' inclinations toward 
consistency (e.g., Abelson et al., 1968; Aronson, 1969; Festinger, 1957). When decisions 
involve actions or inactions, a critical dimension would be whether the decision is consistent 
with decision makers' orientation toward action or inaction. Actions or inactions that are 
consistent with decision makers' orientation should typically be more desirable and less anxiety 
provoking than are actions or inactions that are inconsistent with decision makers' orientation. It 
follows from this reasoning that both perceptions of consistency and feelings of desirability may 
mediate the relationship between action or inaction and judgments of regret. Consequently, an 
act of commission that is consistent with a decision maker's orientation is likely to generate less 
regret than will an act of omission that is inconsistent with the person's orientation. Conversely, 
an act of commission that is inconsistent with a decision maker's orientation is likely to generate 
more regret than will an act of omission that is consistent with the person's orientation. For 
example, a decision to not act is likely to be especially regretted by an active decision maker, 
whereas an action is likely to be especially regretted by an inactive decision maker. 1 
In testing these ideas, the following studies were designed with two major goals in mind. First, 
we were interested in determining when an act of commission would produce a level of regret 
that was higher (or lower) than the level an act of omission would produce. From our 
perspective, this relationship depends on the orientation of the decision maker. Actions or 
inactions that are consistent with decision makers' orientation are desirable and will produce 
relatively low levels of regret, whereas inconsistent actions or inactions are undesirable and will 
produce relatively high levels of regret. The second major goal of this research was to 
determine whether mutability or the desirability and consistency of a decision mediates the 
relationship between action or inaction and judgments of regret.  
 
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS 1–4 
In Experiment 1, participants were told that a businessman (the target) was either a risk seeker 
or a risk avoider. Further, they were told that the businessman had made an error involving 
either an action or an inaction. For an action-oriented risk seeker, an act should be consistent 
and desirable, whereas a decision to not act should be relatively inconsistent and undesirable. 
However, relative to the inactive orientation of a risk avoider, action should be inconsistent and 
undesirable, whereas inaction should be relatively consistent and desirable. When a particular 
orientation is associated strongly with the target, perceivers can adopt the target's perspective 
when making judgments about the target's actions or inactions. Therefore, on the one hand, we 
expect perceivers to judge that inactions are especially regretted when they are performed by a 
risk seeker; on the other hand, we expect perceivers to judge that actions are especially 
regretted when they are performed by a risk avoider. 
N'gbala and Branscombe (1997) have argued against norm theory's (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) 
mutability interpretation as it applies to regret judgments following actions or inactions. 
According to these authors, it is wisdom, not mutability, that causes especially high levels of 
regret to be associated with acts of commission. We expected the desirability and consistency 
of a decision to drive judgments of regret independent of wisdom. For example, on the one 
hand, when perceivers are judging the behavior of a risk seeker, they should associate more 
regret with an act of omission, even though they may believe that the target's decision was 
wise. On the other hand, when perceivers judge the behavior of a person who is risk averse, 
they should associate especially low levels of regret with an act of omission, and they may also 
believe that the act of omission was especially wise. To test the wisdom prediction, we included 
a wisdom measure in Experiment 1. 
In Experiment 2, we concentrated our attention on the vignette concerning the risk-seeking 
businessman to isolate the process(es) responsible for perceivers' regret judgments following 
decisions to act or not act. Specifically, this study was designed to determine whether 
counterfactual thinking or the desirability and consistency of a decision mediated the 
relationship between action or inaction and regret. 
Experiment 3 was designed to determine if decision makers' own regret judgments were 
influenced by their orientation. We expected that from the perspective of an individual with an 
active orientation, inaction would be especially regretted, whereas from the perspective of an 
inactive-oriented decision maker, action would be especially regretted. 
Experiment 4 also involved the judgments and actions or inactions of decision makers. This 
study was designed with two major goals in mind. First, we were interested in providing a 
conceptual replication of Experiment 3 that involved a different procedure. In Experiment 3, 
participants' regret judgments followed their being informed that their action or inaction was in 
error. It is of interest to determine whether similar results can be obtained when participants look 
back at past decisions, given the position advocated by Gilovich and colleagues (Gilovich & 
Medvec, 1994; Gilovich et al., 1995). These authors argued that regret judgments may not 
always be symmetrical across time. For example, Gilovich et al. (1995) have shown that 
although acts of commission can generate more regret at the outset, acts of omission often 
generate more regret in the long run, when decision makers consider decisions that they made 
in the past. From our perspective, the desirability and consistency of an action or inaction can 
be responsible for judgments of regret when these judgments are made at the outset (as in 
Experiment 3) or when they are made by perceivers who consider decisions made in the past 
(as in Experiment 4). 
In Experiment 4, we used a decision problem that was likely to be encountered by our 
participants—one in which they decided to go out (action) or stay home (inaction) when they 
were in either an active or an inactive mood. If we are correct in our analysis, then, just as in 
Experiment 3, a decision associated with inaction should be especially regretted by an action-
oriented decision maker. From the perspective of an inactive-oriented decision maker, a 
decision associated with action should be especially regretted. In addition, this study was 
designed to determine the process(es) responsible for these effects. Specifically, Experiment 4 
was designed to determine whether it was counterfactual thinking or the desirability and 
consistency of the decision that mediated the relationship between decisions associated with 
action or inaction and judgments of regret. 
 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
Seventy-nine female participants from introductory psychology classes were assigned randomly 
to one of four experimental conditions. On average, 8 female participants were in each group. 
We used all female participants because women composed the vast majority of our population 
sample. 
The between-subjects design consisted of two levels of two independent variables. There were 
two levels of the target's orientation (the target was described as being either a risk seeker or a 
risk avoider) and two types of actions (a decision associated with action and one associated 
with inaction). Judgments of regret and decision wisdom were the dependent variables. 
 
Procedure 
Participants read a description of a businessman. These descriptions contained information that 
was similar to that used by Kahneman and Tversky (1982). In the action vignette, participants 
read, “Mr. Paul owned shares in Company B. During the past year he switched to stock in 
Company A. He now finds that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he had kept his stock 
in Company B.” In the inaction vignette, they read, “Mr. Paul owned shares in Company A. 
During the past year he considered switching to stock in Company B, but he decided against it. 
He now finds that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he had switched to Company B.” 
In the risk-seeker condition, participants were told that the businessman was a person who 
enjoyed taking risks, whereas in the risk-avoider condition, they were told that he was a person 
who avoided risks. In the risk-seeker condition, they read, “Mr. Paul loves to take risks. He has 
been known throughout his life as someone who was willing to take a chance. When he was in 
high school, his friends all categorized him as a risk taker. At this point in Mr. Paul's life, he still 
likes to take chances.” In the risk-avoider condition, they read, “Mr. Paul hates to take chances. 
He has been known throughout his life as someone who was not willing to take a chance. When 
he was in high school his friends all categorized him as risk avoidant. At this point in Mr. Paul's 
life, he still does not like to take chances.” 
Participants were asked to indicate the level of regret they felt was associated with the decision. 
Specifically, they were asked, “How much regret do you think Mr. Paul has?” Participants were 
also asked to indicate the level of wisdom they felt was associated with the decision: “How wise 
do you think Mr. Paul was?” For both questions, we used an anchored 101-point scale. For the 
regret question, 0 represented not at all and 100 represented very much. Similarly, for the 
wisdom question, 0 represented not at all and 100 represented very much. 
 
Results and Discussion 
To test the assumption that decisions associated with action are associated with a risk seeker 
and inaction with a risk avoider, we asked a separate set of participants to indicate whether a 
risk avoider or a risk seeker was associated more closely with an action or with an inaction. A 
chi-square analysis revealed that a significant number of participants believed that action was 
associated with a risk taker and inaction with a risk avoider, χ2(1, N = 15) = 9.01, p < .01. 
We performed an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on participants' regret scores. The means for 
each of the four experimental conditions are contained in Table 1. The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect for type of action, F(1, 75) = 5.85, p < .05. In addition, perceivers' 
orientation interacted with the type of action that they evaluated, F(1, 75) = 15.48, p < .001. To 
determine the nature of this interaction, we performed planned contrasts. In the risk-seeker 
condition, we expected more regret to be associated with inaction than with action, whereas we 
expected an opposite pattern in the risk-avoider condition. As may be seen from Table 1, more 
regret was associated with inaction in the risk-seeker condition, F(1, 75) = 7.56, p < .01, 
whereas more regret was associated with action in the risk-avoider condition, F(1, 75) = 7.93, p 
< .01. These data support our assumptions concerning the role that a target's orientation plays 
in social judgment. From the perspective of a risk seeker, a decision not to act was assumed to 
be especially inconsistent and undesirable. Therefore, an especially high level of regret was 
expected to be associated with a risk seeker's inaction. However, from the perspective of a 
person who is risk averse, a decision to act is especially inconsistent and undesirable. 
Consequently, we expected and found an especially high level of regret associated with a risk 
avoider's decision to act.  
 
 
 
To test the role of judgments of wisdom in determining regret, we performed an ANOVA on 
participants' wisdom scores. The means for each of the four experimental conditions are 
contained in Table 2. This analysis revealed a marginally significant type of action main effect, 
F(1, 75) = 2.25, p < .14. As may be seen from Table 2, participants believed the decision to be 
wiser in the act of omission condition than in act of commission condition. We did not obtain an 
Orientation × Type of Action interaction, F(1, 75) = 0.01, p > .90, as was the case for the regret 
measure. In fact, regret and wisdom produced opposite results in the risk-seeker condition. An 
act of omission was associated with an especially high level of regret, even though this action 
was considered an especially wise decision. To further test this issue, we included regret and 
wisdom in a repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis included two levels of orientation and 
two levels of type of action. If perceivers' wisdom estimates are not directly responsible for their 
regret judgments, then the analysis should reveal an Orientation × Type of Action repeated 
measures (regret and wisdom) interaction. This analysis yielded a significant type of Action × 
Orientation interaction, F(1, 75) = 9.71, p < .01, as well as an Orientation × Type of Action × 
Measure interaction, F(1, 75) = 7.75, p < .01. Consequently, judgments about wisdom did not 
mirror judgments of regret, and wisdom judgments were not the primary cause for judgments of 
regret. 
 
 
 
Why the decision makers' orientation was not positively related to perceivers' judgments of 
wisdom is an interesting question. Our data address this question, although this was not the 
primary purpose of the present research. It may be that when perceivers are asked to make a 
wisdom judgment, they are implicitly being asked to concentrate on the merits of the decision 
itself, independent of the relationship between the decision and the decision makers' orientation. 
Therefore, because the decision makers' orientation has an important influence on judgments of 
regret, wisdom judgments may not always be related to regret judgments. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
It is clear from the results of Experiment 1 that information about a target's orientation to act or 
not act influenced perceivers' judgments of regret following an error of commission or omission. 
However, it is not clear from this experiment whether it was desirability and consistency or 
mutability that mediated the relationship between action or inaction and judgments of regret. To 
address this question, we used the risk-seeking vignette from Experiment 1 and asked 
participants questions about the desirability and consistency of their action or inaction. In 
addition, we asked them to list their counterfactual thoughts. 
 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
Thirty-four female and 4 male participants from an introductory psychology class were assigned 
randomly to one of two experimental conditions. The between-subjects design included two 
types of decisions (involving action and inaction) made by a risk-seeking businessman. 
Participants were asked four different questions: a consistency measure, a desirability measure, 
a counterfactual measure, and a regret judgment measure. 
 
Procedure 
Participants read a description that was used in Experiment 1 concerning the risk-seeking 
businessman. However, the way the information was given to participants differed from the way 
it was introduced in Experiment 1. In this study, participants were given information about Mr. 
Paul's risk-seeking personality and his decision to switch or not switch his stock holdings. 
However, they were not given information about the consequence of his decision until after they 
completed a consistency question and a desirability question. Participants were asked how 
consistent the decision (not switching stocks in the inaction condition or switching stocks in the 
action condition) was with the type of action or inaction that Mr. Paul typically desired. We used 
an anchored 101-point scale where 0 represented very inconsistent and 100 represented very 
consistent. Participants were then asked how sad or happy they believed Mr. Paul felt after 
making his decision. We used an anchored 101-point scale where 0 represented very sad and 
100 represented very happy. 
After answering these questions, participants were given information about the results of Mr. 
Paul's decision. The consequences of this decision were identical to those in Experiment 1. In 
both conditions (action and inaction), Mr. Paul would have been better off by $1,200 if he had 
made the opposite decision. 
Participants were also asked to imagine how the outcomes might have been different for Mr. 
Paul and to use those thoughts to complete as many “if only” statements as they could think of. 
These statements referred to how things might have been different if only something had or had 
not occurred. The regret question followed the “if only” questions. We used a 101-point scale 
where 0 represented not at all and 100 represented very much for this regret question. 
 
Results and Discussion 
We performed an ANOVA on participants' judgments of regret. The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect for type of action, F(1, 36) = 11.21, p < .01. Judgments of regret were 
higher in the inaction condition (M = 78.8) than in the action condition (M = 50.3). This result 
was expected, because a decision associated with inaction is inconsistent with the orientation of 
a risk seeker. We also performed a regression analysis with action or inaction serving as the 
predictor variable and judgments of regret as the dependent variable. Consistent with the 
ANOVA, this analysis indicated that action or inaction predicted judgments of regret, β = −.487, 
p < .01. (In this and in all of our subsequent multiple regression analyses, all predictor variables 
were entered simultaneously.) 
To determine whether mutability mediated the relationship between action or inaction and 
judgments of regret, we performed a multiple regression analysis in which the number of 
counterfactuals and action or inaction served as predictor variables and judgments of regret as 
the dependent variable. Action or inaction predicted judgments of regret, β = −.483, p < .01, but 
counterfactuals did not, β = −.036, p > .80. Therefore, the number of counterfactuals did not 
mediate the relationship between action or inaction and judgments of regret. 
Although the number of counterfactuals was not a predictor, it may be the case that the type of 
counterfactuals mediated the relationship between action or inaction and judgments of regret. 
Additive and subtractive counterfactuals are two types of counterfactuals that have been 
identified (e.g., Roese, Hur, & Pennington, 1999). Additive counterfactuals refer to the addition 
of an omitted act, whereas subtractive counterfactuals refer to the deletion of an action. To test 
whether additive or subtractive counterfactuals mediated the relationship between action or 
inaction and judgments of regret, we performed two separate mediational analyses: one in 
which action or inaction and additive counterfactuals served as predictor variables and the other 
in which action or inaction and subtractive counterfactuals served as predictor variables. In the 
first analysis, action or inaction predicted judgments of regret, β = −.513, p < .002, whereas 
additive counterfactuals did not, β = −.128, p > .35. In the second analysis, action or inaction 
predicted judgments of regret, β = −.634, p < .001, whereas subtractive counterfactuals did not, 
β = .241, p > .15. Therefore, neither additive nor subtractive counterfactuals mediated the 
relationship between action or inaction and judgments of regret. 
We expected desirability and consistency to mediate the relationship between action or inaction 
and judgments of regret. To test whether desirability (i.e., how happy or sad the target felt about 
his decision) mediated this relationship, we performed a multiple regression analysis in which 
action or inaction and desirability served as predictor variables and judgments of regret as the 
dependent variable. In this analysis, action or inaction no longer predicted judgments of regret, 
β = −.157, p > .25, whereas desirability did predict judgments of regret, β = −.592, p < .001. As 
desirability increased, regret judgments decreased. Further, desirability was correlated with 
action or inaction, r = −.558, p < .001. Consequently, desirability mediated the relationship 
between action or inaction and judgments of regret. 
Given the strong relationship between consistency and desirability, r = .860, p < .001, 
perceptions of consistency or inconsistency should also mediate this relationship. To test this 
position, we performed a multiple regression analysis in which action or inaction and 
consistency served as predictor variables and judgments of regret as the dependent variable. 
Action or inaction did not predict judgments of regret, β = −.241, p > .09, whereas consistency 
did predict judgments of regret, β = −.549, p < .001. As the degree of consistency increased, 
regret judgments decreased. Further, there was a significant correlation between consistency 
and action or inaction, r = −.449, p < .01. Therefore, consistency mediated the relationship 
between action or inaction and judgments of regret. 
These results provide strong support for our view that decisions that are especially undesirable 
and inconsistent from the perspective of decision makers generate especially high levels of 
regret. Desirability and consistency both mediated the relationship between action or inaction 
and judgments of regret, whereas mutability did not. 
The results of this experiment, as well as those of Experiment 1, bear on the conclusions drawn 
from a recent study by Roese et al. (1999). These authors applied Higgins's promotion and 
prevention focus distinction to counterfactual thinking. According to Higgins (e.g., Higgins, 
1996a, 1996b, 1999), two distinct self-regulatory systems exist. The promotion focus is 
concerned with advancement and accomplishments: It involves situations that represent the 
presence or absence of positive outcomes. The prevention focus is concerned with safety and 
nonlosses: It involves situations that represent the presence or absence of negative outcomes. 
Using this distinction, Roese et al. (1999) found that additive counterfactuals were associated 
with a promotion focus, whereas subtractive counterfactuals were associated with a prevention 
focus. 
However, Roese et al. (1999) did not measure perceivers' judgments of regret, nor were they 
concerned with how the relationship between the decision and the decision maker's orientation 
influenced these judgments. Rather, they concentrated their attention on additive and 
subtractive counterfactuals. Inferences about regret judgments were based on perceivers' 
production of additive and subtractive counterfactuals. Consequently, they did not test whether 
counterfactual thinking mediated the relationship between action or inaction and regret. In the 
present study, we determined that neither the number nor the type of counterfactual thoughts 
mediated the relationship between decisions (associated with actions or inactions) and 
judgments of regret. Rather, it was the perceived desirability and consistency of these decisions 
that mediated this relationship. 
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 provide support for our interpretation of judgments 
concerning errors of commission and omission. However, participants in all of these studies 
made judgments about a target's action or inaction, not about their own decisions. Experiment 3 
was designed to determine if actors' orientation influences judgments about their own 
behavior—about their own errors of commission and omission. 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
One hundred fourteen female participants from introductory psychology classes were assigned 
randomly to one of four experimental conditions. Participants were tested in small groups 
containing, on average, 12 participants. 
The between-subjects design included two levels of two independent variables. There were two 
orientation conditions (action or inactive) and two action types (error of commission or error of 
omission). 
 
Procedure 
Each participant read that the experimenter was interested in determining how students at the 
school performed on a decision-making task relative to other students, as well as how the 
student's school performed relative to other schools in the system. The student's task was to 
choose the company that made the most profit. They were told that the correct answer was 
based on archival data from actual case files. Participants read that although the profit of the 
company was hypothetical, it would contribute to their score. That is, the more the company 
they chose earned, the better their score. 
The task we chose was framed in a way that would allow us to induce the vast majority of our 
participants to either keep stock in the company they were given (an act of omission) or switch 
to stock in a different company (an act of commission). We used this procedure to manipulate 
independently participants' decision to engage in an error of omission or commission. To 
accomplish this, we modified a vignette used by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). 
All participants read that they could keep a stock in Company X or switch to Company Z. In the 
error of omission condition, they read that if they kept stock in Company X, they could earn a 
$2,000 profit. Their other option was to switch from this stock to stock in Company Z. If they 
switched to Company Z, they would have a one-third probability of having a $6,000 profit and a 
two-thirds probability of gaining no profit. In a study using a similar task, the vast majority of 
participants (over 70%) chose to keep stock in Company X (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). After 
making their choice, participants choosing to keep stock in Company X were told that they 
would have been better off by $4,000 if they had switched to Company Z. 
In the error of commission condition, participants read that if they kept stock in Company X, they 
would have a one-third probability of having a $6,000 profit and a two-thirds probability of 
gaining no profit. Their other option was to switch from this stock to stock in Company Z and 
earn a $2,000 profit. In a study with a similar vignette, the vast majority of participants chose to 
switch (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). After making their choice, participants choosing to switch 
their stock were told that they would have been better off by $4,000 if they had stayed with 
Company X. [2] 
After being given information about their decision, participants were told that the decision-
making part of the experiment was concluded. In the next task, the experimenter was interested 
in determining events that made people feel a particular way. In the active mood orientation 
condition, participants were asked to write six statements describing situations that made them 
feel happy and energetic, whereas in the inactive mood orientation condition, they were asked 
to write six statements describing situations that made them feel sad and depressed. 
After this manipulation, participants were asked to indicate the amount of regret that they felt in 
having made their decision on the task involving stocks. Participants were asked to indicate 
their level of regret on a 101-point scale, where 0 represented no regret and 100 represented 
very much regret. 
 
Results and Discussion 
To determine whether participants adhered to our orientation manipulation, we had two raters 
judge the positivity of each statement. In the active mood orientation condition, 97% of the 
statements were considered positive by Rater 1; 100% were considered positive by Rater 2. In 
the inactive mood orientation condition, 98% were considered negative by Rater 1, whereas 
100% of the statements were considered negative by Rater 2. The responses of Rater 1 were 
positively correlated with those of Rater 2, r = .94, p < .001. 3 In addition, we asked a separate 
group of 33 students whether a happy and energetic mood was associated with action or 
inaction and whether a sad and depressed mood was associated with action or inaction. Ninety-
one percent of participants indicated that a happy and energetic mood was associated with 
action, and 91% of participants indicated that a sad and depressed mood was associated with 
inaction. 
We performed an ANOVA on participants' regret scores. The means for each of the four 
experimental conditions are contained in Table 3. The analysis revealed an Orientation × Type 
of Action interaction, F(1, 88) = 7.2, p < .01. [4] To determine the nature of this interaction, we 
performed planned contrasts. In the active mood orientation condition, more regret was 
associated with an error of omission than with an error of commission, F(1, 88) = 4.29, p < .05. 
An opposite pattern emerged in the inactive mood orientation condition. In this condition, more 
regret was associated with an error of commission than with an error of omission, F(1, 88) = 3.0, 
p < .09. [5] These results provide support for our analysis of regret judgments following errors of 
omission and commission. Specifically, they provide support for our view that decisions that are 
desirable and consistent with decision makers' orientation produce especially low levels of 
regret; actions or inactions that are undesirable and inconsistent with orientation produce 
especially high levels of regret.  
 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 4 
Experiment 4 was designed with several purposes in mind. First, we were interested in 
determining whether we could conceptually replicate the results of Experiment 3 with a different 
procedure. In Experiment 3, decisions and judgments of regret were made in close temporal 
proximity with one another. In Experiment 4, we used a different situation, one in which 
participants were looking back at a decision. They were asked to consider either a decision 
associated with an action or one associated with an inaction; the decisions produced identical 
losses. 
The decision context used in this experiment was one that participants were very likely to have 
personally experienced: a decision to stay home or to go out. When making this decision, 
participants are often in an active or inactive mood. Therefore, we asked our participants to 
remember themselves in an active or inactive mood while they thought about their decision. On 
the one hand, a decision associated with inaction should be especially inconsistent (and 
undesirable) from the perspective of a decision maker in an active mood. Therefore, for a 
person with this orientation, inaction should produce especially high levels of regret. On the 
other hand, a decision associated with inaction should be especially consistent and desirable 
from the perspective of a person in an inactive mood. Therefore, for a person with this 
orientation, inaction should produce especially low levels of regret. These expected results 
would conceptually replicate those obtained in Experiment 3. 
In Experiment 4, perceivers considered decisions that they made in the past. In prior research, 
when perceivers have been asked to consider decisions made in the past, decisions associated 
with inaction have typically produced more regret than have decisions associated with action 
(e.g., Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; Gilovich et al., 1995). The expected results of Experiment 4 
would indicate that even when perceivers consider decisions that they made in the past, a 
decision to act may be especially regretted by an inactive-oriented person, but it may be the 
decision to not act that is especially regretted by an active-oriented person. 
We were also interested in determining whether mutability or desirability and consistency 
mediated the relationship between action or inaction and judgments of regret. To address this 
question, we asked participants questions about the desirability and consistency of their action 
or inaction. In addition, we asked them to list their counterfactual thoughts. 
 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
Forty-seven female and 5 male participants from an introductory psychology class served as 
participants in exchange for partial credit toward the completion of research requirements. The 
between-subjects design consisted of two levels of two independent variables. 6 There were two 
orientation conditions (active and inactive) and two action types (decision associated with action 
or inaction). Participants were asked four different questions: a consistency measure, a 
desirability measure, a counterfactual measure, and a regret judgment measure. 
 
Procedure 
Each participant was given a sheet of typed instructions. Participants were told to read the 
information and to answer the questions that pertained to the information. They were asked to 
think about a situation in which they were at home and considered whether to stay home or go 
out. They either stayed home (in the decision associated with the inactive condition) or decided 
to go out (in the decision associated with the inactive condition). In all cases, participants were 
told that they found out that they would have been somewhat better off if they had made the 
opposite decision—to go out when they stayed home or to stay home when they went out. 
In addition, participants in the inactive and active orientation conditions were told that when they 
made their decision, they were in an inactive or active mood. In the inactive orientation 
condition, participants were tired from a busy day and were interested in remaining in their 
present state; participants in the action orientation condition were active and were also 
interested in remaining in their present state. 
Participants were reminded of their mood state before being asked questions concerning their 
decision. In the consistency question, they were asked to indicate how consistent their decision 
(staying home or going out) was with their mood on an anchored 101-point scale where 0 
represented very inconsistent and 100 represented very consistent. Participants were then 
asked to indicate how happy they felt after making this decision on an anchored 101-point scale 
where 0 represented very unhappy and 100 represented very happy. 
After answering these questions, participants were asked to imagine how the outcomes might 
have been different for them and to use those thoughts to complete as many “if only” statements 
as they could think of. These statements referred to how things might have been different if only 
something had or had not occurred. Finally, participants were asked to indicate how much 
regret they had on a 101-point scale where 0 represented not at all and 100 represented very 
much. 
Results and Discussion 
We performed an ANOVA on participants' judgments of regret. The analysis revealed a 
significant Orientation × Type of Action interaction, F(1, 54) = 15.33, p < .05. Table 4 contains 
the means of the four experimental conditions. 7 To explore this interaction, we performed two 
additional analyses: one on the active orientation condition and the other on the inactive 
orientation condition. For the active orientation condition, simple effects tests revealed a 
significant main effect for type of action, F(1, 27) = 7.20, p < .05. As expected, participants had 
especially high levels of regret when they had decided not to act. Opposite effects were 
expected and obtained in the inactive orientation condition. In this condition, the analysis 
revealed a significant main effect for action type, F(1, 27) = 8.24, p < .05. However, participants 
in this condition had especially high levels of regret when they decided to act. These results 
conceptually replicate those obtained in Experiments 1–3.  
 
 
 
Within the active orientation condition, we also performed a regression analysis with decisions 
to act or not act serving as the predictor variable and judgments of regret as the dependent 
variable. Consistent with the ANOVA, this analysis indicated that the decision to act or not act 
predicted judgments of regret, β = −.459, p < .05. Especially high levels of regret were 
associated with decisions not to act. An identical analysis was performed within the inactive 
orientation condition. This analysis was also consistent with the ANOVA. The decision to act or 
not act predicted judgments of regret, β = .483, p < .05. Especially high levels of regret were 
associated with decisions to act. 
To determine whether mutability mediated the relationship between the decision to act or not act 
and judgments of regret within the active orientation condition, we performed a multiple 
regression analysis in which the number of counterfactuals and decisions to act or not act 
served as predictor variables and judgments of regret as the dependent variable. We performed 
the identical analysis within the inactive orientation condition. Decisions to act or not to act 
predicted judgments of regret in both the active and the inactive orientation conditions, β = −.44, 
p < .05, and β = .525, p < .05, respectively, but counterfactuals did not, β = .077, p > .60, and β 
= .233, p > .15, respectively. Therefore, the number of counterfactuals did not mediate the 
relationship between decisions to act or not act and judgments of regret. 
Although the number of counterfactuals was not a mediator, it may be the case that the type of 
counterfactual (additive or subtractive) mediated the relationship between decisions to act or not 
act and judgments of regret. First, we tested whether additive counterfactuals mediated the 
relationship between decisions to act or not act and judgments of regret within the active 
orientation condition. We performed a multiple regression analysis in which additive 
counterfactuals and decision to act or not act served as predictor variables and judgments of 
regret as the dependent variable. We performed the identical analysis within the inactive 
orientation condition. Decisions to act or not act predicted judgments of regret in both the active 
and the inactive orientation conditions, β = −.438, p < .05, and β = .547, p < .05, respectively. 
Additive counterfactuals, however, did not predict judgments of regret in either the active or the 
inactive orientation condition, β = .212, p > .20, and β = .24, p > .15, respectively. Consequently, 
addictive counterfactuals did not mediate the relationship between decisions to act or not act 
and judgments of regret. 
Identical analyses were performed on subtractive counterfactuals. Within both the active and the 
inactive orientation conditions, we performed a multiple regression analysis in which subtractive 
counterfactuals and decisions to act or not act served as predictor variables and judgments of 
regret as the dependent variable. Decisions to act or not act predicted judgments of regret in 
both the active and the inactive orientation conditions, β = −.489, p < .01, and β = .487, p < .01, 
respectively. However, subtractive counterfactuals did not predict judgments of regret in either 
the active or the inactive orientation condition, β = −.131, p > .40, and β = .12, p > .40, 
respectively. Therefore, subtractive counterfactuals did not mediate the relationship between 
action or inaction and judgments of regret. 
To test whether desirability (i.e., how unhappy or happy the participant felt about this decision) 
mediated this relationship within the active orientation condition, we performed a multiple 
regression analysis in which decisions to act or not act and desirability served as predictor 
variables and judgments of regret as the dependent variable. We performed the identical 
analysis within the inactive orientation condition. Decisions to act or not act no longer predicted 
judgments of regret in either the active or the inactive orientation condition, β = −.116, p > .50, 
and β = −.019, p > .50, respectively, but desirability continued to predict judgments of regret. 
Desirability was a significant predictor in the active orientation condition, β = −.561, p < .01, and 
in the inactive orientation condition, β = −.752, p < .01. In both conditions, as desirability 
increased, feelings of regret decreased. Furthermore, desirability was correlated with decisions 
to act or not act in both the active and the inactive orientation conditions, r = −.611, p < .01, and 
r = .688, p < .01, respectively. Consequently, desirability mediated the relationship between 
decisions to act or not act and judgments of regret. 
Desirability was also highly related to consistency, r = .864, p < .01. Therefore, like desirability, 
consistency also mediated the relationship between action or inaction and judgments of regret, 
as shown by regression analyses in which action or inaction and consistency served as 
predictor variables and judgments of regret as the dependent variable. In both the active and 
the inactive orientation conditions, action or inaction no longer predicted judgments of regret, β 
= −.195, p < .30, and β = .148, p < .50, respectively, but consistency did. It predicted regret 
judgments in the active orientation condition, β = −.431, p < .05, and in the inactive orientation 
condition, β = −.429, p < .05. In both conditions, as the degree of consistency increased, 
judgments of regret decreased. 
These results then converge with the results of Experiments 1–3 in providing support for our 
view that decisions that are especially inconsistent with decision makers' orientation will 
generate especially high levels of regret. In addition, they converge with the results of 
Experiment 2 in providing support for the view that desirability and consistency can mediate the 
relationship between decisions and judgments of regret. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
It is typically assumed that counterfactual thinking mediates the relationship between action or 
inaction and judgments of regret (see N'gbala & Branscombe, 1997). In contrast to this widely 
held assumption, the present research suggests that the desirability and consistency of the 
decision play the mediational role. One determinant of a decision's desirability is whether it is 
consistent with the goals, personality, or general tendencies of the decision maker. When the 
desirability of decisions emanates from consistency relationships, both consistency and 
desirability should be functional in determining levels of regret. In the present research, we 
supported this reasoning and found that both consistency and desirability mediated the 
relationship between decisions to act or not act and judgments of regret. Therefore, the 
relationship between action or inaction and judgments of regret depends on whether it is the 
action or inaction that is most consistent with the decision maker's orientation. From the 
perspective of an action-oriented decision maker, inaction is inconsistent and undesirable, and 
consequently inaction is especially regretted. From the perspective of an inactive-oriented 
decision maker, action is inconsistent and undesirable, and consequently action is especially 
regretted. The results of Experiments 1–4 supported this analysis. 
From our view, events, actions, or decisions that are associated with negative consequences 
may generate especially high levels of regret simply because they are inconsistent with 
perceivers' orientation. This perspective is in contrast to more widely held assumptions, derived 
from norm theory, that judgments of normality involve the generation of counterfactuals (e.g., 
Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Judgments of an event's normality or of a decision's consistency can 
be relatively automatic and may involve relatively molar comparisons of present circumstances 
to the perceiver's orientation (e.g., expectations, mood, or goals). For example, to determine a 
behavior's normality, perceivers may compare present behavior with past behavior; to determine 
the consistency of a decision, perceivers may compare a decision with their present mood state 
or goal. Thus, judgments of normality may involve less effortful processing than that involved in 
the generation of counterfactuals. Under such circumstances, counterfactuals would not be 
expected to mediate judgments of normality or feelings of regret. 
However, counterfactuals may mediate judgments of regret under other circumstances. For 
example, counterfactuals may be generated when perceivers' reactions to events are very 
intense or abnormal. In this situation, affective intensity or abnormality may be initially generated 
from relatively automatic comparisons of present circumstances with general orientations or with 
decision makers' knowledge structure, but this initial reaction may be followed by more effortful 
search processing involving attempts to understand, predict, or control the situation. 
Counterfactuals may be generated in this search. Thus, the event's mutability may be 
increased, which in turn may augment feelings of regret. If so, counterfactuals would be 
expected to play a mediational or moderating role in feelings of regret. Therefore, for 
counterfactual thinking to be influential, it may be necessary for perceivers to be motivated to 
engage in a search process and have sufficient cognitive capacity to access or construct 
alternative worlds. Of course, it may also be the case that when the event is only moderately 
inconsistent the search is likely to involve reasons that justify the event, in much the same way 
and for the same reasons that a perceiver justifies when confronted with dissonant information 
(e.g., Festinger, 1957). Perceivers may reduce the unpleasant consequences of inconsistency 
directly by altering their thoughts concerning the event or indirectly by affirming their self-worth 
on an unrelated dimension (e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983). 
In essence, we are suggesting a two-process model in which an initial stage involves relatively 
automatic comparisons that can produce affective reactions and judgments of abnormality. For 
example, judgments of abnormality and feelings of regret may follow directly from automatic 
comparisons of events with a perceiver's orientation. In this stage, counterfactuals would not be 
expected to mediate judgments of abnormality or feelings of regret. In a second, more effortful 
process, counterfactuals would be expected to play a role in these judgments. In this stage, 
search processes involving the generation of counterfactuals may be initiated by rather intense 
affective reactions. These generated counterfactuals may alter judgments of abnormality and 
feelings of regret. Of course, future research is necessary to test the viability of this dual-
process model. However, the results of the present research suggest that this direction may be 
fruitful. 
Although our studies were designed to directly test the general question concerning how 
differences in consistency and desirability influenced judgments of regret, the natures of our 
manipulations (risk seeker vs. risk avoider; action vs. inaction) are consistent with the activities 
of either a promotion- or a prevention-focused individual. Studies that have manipulated self-
regulatory focus by altering momentary contextual factors, such as feedback, have shown that 
participants with a promotion focus behave quite differently from those with a prevention focus. 
For example, while working on a signal detection task, individuals with a promotion focus 
demonstrated a risky response bias, whereas those with a prevention focus demonstrated a 
conservative response bias (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). The risky response bias was derived from 
participants' state of eagerness: their desire to advance and to avoid errors of omission. 
However, the conservative response bias was derived from prevention-focused participants' 
state of vigilance: their desire to guard against losses and to ensure against errors of 
commission. A promotion focus, then, is associated with a state of risk, eagerness, or action, 
just as in our risk-seeker and active orientation manipulations. A prevention focus is associated 
with a state of safety or inactivity, just as in our risk avoider and inactive orientation 
manipulations. Consequently, just as an action is typically consistent with the orientation of risk 
seekers and active individuals, it can also be associated with the orientation of a promotion-
focused individual. Conversely, just as an inaction is typically consistent with the orientation of 
risk avoiders and inactive individuals, it can also be associated with the orientation of a 
prevention-focused individual. Therefore, in addition to providing information about action- or 
inaction-oriented persons, the results of our studies provide information about how promotion- 
and prevention-focused individuals respond to errors that follow from action versus inaction. 
Our analysis speaks to situations in which decisions and judgments are in close temporal 
proximity to one another, as shown by the results of Experiments 1–3. It is also applicable to 
situations in which perceivers consider a decision from the past, as shown by the results of 
Experiment 4. In this study, a decision to act was especially regretted by an inaction-oriented 
perceiver, but it was the decision to not act that was especially regretted by an action-oriented 
perceiver. These results suggest that when decisions are made in the past, actions are not 
always more regretted than are inactions, as has been assumed by authors of prior work (e.g., 
Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; Gilovich et al., 1995). 
Our approach may also contribute to an understanding of how temporal relationships influence 
feelings of regret. It may be the case that an orientation toward action is typical when persons 
engage in retrospective thinking. In this situation, perceivers often think about how things could 
have been better. In essence, they are thinking about the presence or absence of positive 
outcomes. This type of thinking is associated with a promotion focus (e.g., Higgins, 1999), which 
often entails action and risk seeking (e.g., Crowe & Higgins, 1997). This orientation, then, may 
cause errors of omission (from inaction) to be associated with an especially high level of regret. 
When individuals judge ongoing actions or inactions, they may be concerned about losses. This 
is likely to occur when immediate consequences of winning and losing are associated with their 
decision. In this case, the consequence of a loss is often more intense than is the consequence 
of a win (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). As a result, because these persons are concerned 
mostly about a loss, they may have a prevention focus, which is associated with inaction and 
risk aversion (e.g., Crowe & Higgins, 1997). This orientation may cause decision makers to 
associate an especially high level of regret with an act of commission. 
We have shown that both consistency and desirability can mediate the relationship between 
action or inaction and judgments of regret. However, this may not always be the case. 
Desirability may be influenced by other factors as well as by consistency. Further, consistency 
may not always be related to desirability. For example, in situations in which the two decisions 
(action vs. inaction) are not differentially related to the decision maker's orientation, decisions to 
act or not act may not be influenced by the consistency of the decision. However, if there are 
differences in the desirability of the two decisions, desirability may still mediate the relationship 
between decisions to act or not act and judgments of regret. 
In Experiments 1–4, we used situations in which decisions to act or not act were either 
consistent or inconsistent with decision makers' orientation. Furthermore, decision makers in our 
studies were not implicitly or explicitly motivated to change their orientation. However, in some 
contexts, decision makers may have a goal to alter their present orientation. For example, a 
risk-averse person may have the goal of becoming a risk seeker. This situation can present a 
conflict between tendencies associated with the individual's present orientation and the 
individual's possible self (Markus & Nurius, 1986)—the individual's future plans and goals. A 
decision to not act may be most desirable from the individual's present risk-avoiding orientation, 
whereas a decision to act may be most desirable from the perspective of the individual's 
possible self—the individual's goal of becoming a risk seeker. In such a situation, the decision 
maker may oscillate between orientations. When the risk-avoiding orientation is especially 
salient and memorable, a decision to act would be especially regretted; when the goal of 
becoming a risk seeker is especially salient and memorable, a decision to not act would be 
especially regretted. Therefore, by altering the relative influence of an individual's present 
orientation and the individual's possible self, perceivers may also change the regret level 
associated with a decision. This analysis, then, may provide a useful way of reducing regret 
levels associated with decisions by altering individuals' orientation. 
There may be qualitative differences in the type of regret that a decision maker experiences. For 
example, errors associated with decisions involving persons' ideal self-views may produce a 
different type of regret than will those involving ought self-views. Higgins (e.g., 1996b, 1999) has 
provided a theoretical account of how ideal and ought self-guides can produce different 
emotions. According to Higgins, people experience dejection-type emotions when they fail to 
live up to their ideal self-guides (e.g., ideal goals), whereas they experience agitation-type 
emotions when they fail to live up to their ought self-guides (e.g., obligations). Therefore, the 
type of emotion associated with regret may depend on whether an error is related to a person's 
ideal or to a person's ought self-guide. 
In a decision context, a person's ideal or ought self-guide can be the orientation that is related to 
the person's decision. The ideal self-guide can serve as the relevant orientation when the 
decision involves ideal goals or other issues related to this orientation, whereas the ought self-
guide can serve as the relevant orientation when the decision involves obligations or other 
aspects of the ought self. Therefore, although decisions that are inconsistent with a person's 
ideal self-guide and decisions that are inconsistent with a person's ought self-guide are both 
undesirable, these decisions can be associated with different types of undesirable feelings. 
Decisions that are associated with a person's ideal self-guide can generate dejection-type 
emotions, whereas decisions associated with the person's ought self-guide can generate 
agitation-type emotions. Therefore, although people experience regret after committing errors of 
commission or omission, in one case, regret may be laced with dejection, whereas in another 
case, it may be laced with agitation. 
We proposed that decisions to act or not act that are consistent with decision makers' 
orientation are desirable and will produce especially low levels of regret; decisions to act or not 
act that are inconsistent with decision makers' orientation are undesirable and will produce 
especially high levels of regret. We also proposed that desirability and consistency would 
mediate the relationship between decisions to act or not act and judgments of regret. The 
results of all four experiments supported our view. In addition, they showed that the relationship 
between action or inaction and judgments of regret was not mediated by mutability, as is often 
assumed. Rather, desirability and consistency mediated this relationship, independent of 
mutability. 
 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Consistency and desirability are often related when considering decisions to act or not 
act. However, consistency is not the only factor that is related to desirability. For 
example, an action may be desirable or undesirable because of its association with 
specific consequences. In this article, we concentrate on those situations in which the 
desirability of decisions emanates from the relationship of the decision to the decision 
maker's orientation. We discuss this issue further in the General Discussion section. 
2. Participants who did not keep their stock in the error of omission condition and 
participants who did not switch stocks in the error of commission condition were also told 
that they would have been better off if they had made the opposite decision. However, 
according to our decision task, these participants would have been better off by $2,000, 
not $4,000, as was the case for participants who kept their stock in the error of omission 
condition or switched their stock in the error of commission condition. 
3. Both raters independently reached the conclusion that one participant did not follow 
instructions. Therefore, this participant was excluded from further analysis. 
4. Ninety-two of our 114 participants were included in the above analysis. This analysis 
only included participants who were induced to either keep stock in the company or 
switch to stock in a different company. 
5. We also performed an analysis in which we included participants who did not keep their 
stock in the error of omission condition and those who did not switch their stock in the 
error of commission condition. The scores of participants who did not keep their stock 
were included with those of error of commission participants, whereas the scores of 
participants who did not switch were included with those of error of omission 
participants. This analysis included 113 of our 114 participants. It did not include the 1 
participant who did not follow instructions. The results of this ANOVA (just as those of 
the ANOVA discussed in this Results and Discussion section) revealed a significant 
Orientation × Type of Action interaction, F(1, 109) = 8.81, p < .01. The pattern of this 
interaction was such that for active-oriented participants, more regret was associated 
with an error of omission; for inactive-oriented participants, more regret was associated 
with an error of commission. 
6. Participants were assigned randomly within the inactive-orientation condition and within 
the active-orientation condition. The inactive- and active-orientation conditions were run 
(in the same lab and by the same experimenter) on separate days. One day separated 
the running of these conditions. However, because we expected these two conditions to 
produce opposite effects and because we also analyzed each condition separately, we 
have combined the two conditions for ease of presentation. 
7. After the experiment, participants were asked if they had experienced a situation similar 
to the one they had just thought about. The vast majority (47 of 52 participants) indicated 
that they had experienced a similar situation. 
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